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Preface 
 
This report contains the primary findings from a study that took place from mid 2008 
until mid 2009. This study investigates whether political parties and/or actors associ-
ated with political parties can and do exert influence on the appointment of public of-
ficials, both within the national administration and in semi-public organizations. The 
study is part of an international, comparative study into ‘party patronage’ that was 
conducted in the same time period in fourteen European countries. 
 
In the Netherlands, 47 interviews were held with experts on nine policy sectors. I am 
indebted to the participation and frankness of the (anonymous) respondents, for with-
out their willingness to talk this study would not have been possible.  
 
Next to this report, a number of other (scientific) publications are scheduled to ap-
pear. If you are interested to learn more about the project and/or the publications, 
please contact the researcher. 
 
Rotterdam, December 2009 
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Research design 
 
This study investigates whether political parties try to influence appointments in the 
(semi)-public sector. To this end, a qualitative survey was carried out following an in-
ternational research protocol. First, a map of the state was made, sampling similar 
organizations in nine policy sectors in fourteen European countries. In the Dutch 
case this amounted to 71 organizations, see Appendix 1. Second, all appointment 
procedures for these selected organizations were analyzed to ascertain which formal 
arrangements are in place. Third, interviews were held following a topic list (see Ap-
pendix 2). For each policy sector five experts were interviewed leading to a total of 45 
or more interviews, depending on the size of the sector. Appendix 3 shows which 
Dutch experts were interviewed and what their expertise entailed. Respondents will 
remain anonymous in this report, so there will be no interview quotes and conclu-
sions are always based on the responses of multiple respondents. Finally, the data 
from the interviews was coded and stored in a database (SPSS) to be able to per-
form some statistical analyses. The database will be merged with the data from four-
teen other countries, where the same study was carried out using the same method-
ology.1
In this report the primary findings from the interviews are described. Data is 
presented about the respondents and their answers. Topics that will be dealt with in-
clude the scope and reach of party patronage, motives for political parties to try to in-
fluence appointments, appointment practices and sector differences. Findings will 
only be described, not explained or tested. The report is in English because of the 
comparative nature of the international project. 
 
 
Respondents 
 
From mid 2008 until spring 2009, a total of 47 interviews were held with 49 respon-
dents; two interviews took place with two respondents at the same time. Two re-
spondents were interviewed about more than one policy sector, leading to 51 obser-
vations in the database (see Table 1). 
 
                                                 
1 The project is co-ordinated by prof.dr. Peter Mair (EU Institute Florence) and dr. Petr Ko-
pecky (University of Leiden). Participating researchers come from Austria, Germany, Nor-
way, Denmark, Greece, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Czeck Republic, 
Bulgaria, Hungary and The Netherlands. 
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Table 1. Number of respondents per sector 
Sector Respondents Sector Respondents
Economy 5 Health care 4 
Finance 3 Culture and education 6 
Judiciary 5 Foreign Affairs & development aid 5 
Media 6 Regional and local government 6 
Military and Police 9 Civil service in general 2 
 
Appendix 3 lists the names of the respondents, and provides an indication of their 
expertise. A snowball sample was used to select the respondents. In most cases, a 
first respondent was selected through personal and professional networks of the re-
searcher. Each respondent was asked to name persons who could be interviewed. 
Non-response was low; only two persons refused to participate in the study, and one 
interview was cancelled because of a job change. 
Respondents were selected because of their expert knowledge of certain pol-
icy sectors. The selection of respondents also aimed to obtain a diverse sample, to 
obtain viewpoints from appointees, appointers, and independent observers. Table 2 
provides an overview of the variation in background of respondents. 
 
Table 2. Background of respondents 
 Number 
(Former) public official or (top) civil servant 18 
Member of non-executive board 8 
(Former) politician 8 
Academic 8 
Appointed official (in semi-public organization) 5 
Independent 2 
 
 
Selection of organizations 
 
For this study, nine policy sectors were selected (see Table 1). For each sector a 
number of organizations were selected, divided into three groups: ministries or minis-
terial units, non-departmental agencies/bodies, and executive organizations. Note 
that this selection is tailored to the needs of the international project; an international 
comparable set of organizations is selected, which does not fit entirely with the ad-
ministrative, legal and sectoral peculiarities of individual countries.  
Appendix 1 shows which organizations have been selected for the Dutch case. 
This ranges from pure state organizations – such as ministries, tax service, inspecto-
rates, prosecution office, and intelligence agencies – to (privatized) state owned 
companies (SOC) like the Dutch railways, telecommunications and Gas Company. In 
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between these extremes, four types of organizations can be distinguished according 
to their legal status in Dutch law: 
1. Contract Agencies (in Dutch: agentschappen) have no legal personality and all 
their decisions are subject to full ministerial accountability. Their autonomy is re-
stricted to managerial decisions, within legal and financial boundaries. All em-
ployees are civil servants. 
2. Independent Administrative Bodies (in Dutch: ZBOs); almost all ZBOs have legal 
personality, which can be based on public (about 60% of cases) or private law 
(about 40%). Their performance is only in part subject to ministerial accountability. 
3. Legal Entities with a Statutory Task (in Dutch: RWT) are statutory bodies with le-
gal personality, either based on public or private law. In practice, most of these 
bodies are school boards. Other examples are museums and university hospitals. 
4. Water Boards and other public bodies as determined by article 134 of the Dutch 
Constitution are entirely independent bodies. As of 2004, the Water Boards are 
elected bodies. 
Most of these organizations are included in the categories ‘non-departmental agen-
cies’ and ‘executive agencies’ of the international project. Finally, a number of advi-
sory bodies is included; officially recognized by the state, with their own statutes and 
a high degree of independence. The most exceptional organization in the selection is 
the national court of audit (in Dutch: Algemene Rekenkamer), which has its own con-
stitutional basis and independence. 
In total, 71 organizations have been selected. See Table 3 for the different 
categorizations. 
 
Table 3. Selected organizations per category 
International project  Dutch legal types 
Type Number Type Number 
Ministries or ministerial units 11 Ministries or ministerial units 18 
Non-departmental agencies 39 Contract agency 9 
Executive bodies 21 ZBO 23 
  RWT 3 
  State Owned Company 4 
  Other 14 
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Scope and reach of patronage 
 
The analysis of the formal appointment procedures in the selected organizations 
shows that appointments are generally the prerogative of the parent minister i.e. the 
minister who is in charge of the policy sector in which organizations are active (in at 
least 85% of the organizations, see Figure 1 below). For example, all civil servants 
are appointed by the minister. This includes employees of contract agencies as well. 
In practice, ministers are actively involved in the appointment of top civil servants like 
directors, directors-general (DG) and secretaries-general (SG). Lower level appoint-
ments are mandated to the SG. 
 For the appointment to top positions (salary scale >15, usually DG and SG) a 
special procedure applies because of the involvement of the so-called ABD (in Dutch: 
Algemene Bestuursdienst). This service was established in 1995 to improve the man-
agement capabilities and mobility of top civil servants. The ABD manages a pool of 
top civil servants; in fact, these civil servants are employees of the Home Office 
(BZK). Therefore, the minister of the Home Office has to co-sign the appointment de-
cision of top civil servants.  
All appointments of ABD members are temporary; top civil servants are ex-
pected to take up a new position every five years (or shorter in case of interim man-
agement). About 35% of the directors of the 71 organizations for the study reported 
here are member of the ABD.   
The ABD is not an entirely closed circuit; about 10% of job openings are ex-
pected to be fulfilled by outside candidates. There are three evident exceptions to the 
application of the ABD-procedures, namely the armed forces, the diplomat service 
and the judiciary. In each of these sectors, directors are civil servants but because 
additional requirements are made about the training background and/or previous ca-
reer, outsiders are hardly ever appointed (or considered).  
The ABD has expanded its scope over time to include appointments to inter-
national positions and lower level governments. In 2008 a pilot was started regarding 
appointments to ZBOs. For more information see www.algemenebestuursdienst.nl.  
 
There are two noteworthy exceptions to the ministerial prerogative of appointments: 
appointments to the High Council (the highest court) and the Netherlands Court of 
Audit have to be approved by parliament. 
 
Next to the strong influence of the minister on appointments within the ministry, they 
are also quite often responsible for appointments to organizations at arms’ length 
(see Table 4). This can involve the appointment of the CEO and members of execu-
tive and non-executive boards (in Dutch: raad van toezicht). And in those cases 
where the appointment constitutes a Royal Decision (in Dutch: Koninklijk Besluit), the 
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minister will nominate a candidate. This nomination is discussed in the council of min-
isters that usually agrees with the nomination, after which the Queen will sign the ap-
pointment decision. Although the minister does not formally appoint in such cases, 
his influence is still extensive. 
 
Table 4. Formal appointment procedures (ministries excluded) 
Appointment of CEO (N=60) Appointment of members of non-executive 
board (N=30) 
Minister of parent ministry 45% Minister of parent ministry 37% 
Board of the organization 31% Board of the organization 23% 
Royal Decision 14% Royal Decision 40% 
 
In the case of the appointment of members of non-executive boards, nominations 
play an important role. Boards nominate a candidate to the minister (7 out of 10) or 
themselves (co-optation was found in 7 organizations), and ministers nominate to the 
council of ministers in case of a Royal Decision (9 out of 11).  
 
Interestingly, respondents tend to underestimate the (formal) influence of the minis-
ter. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of respondents that states that politicians 
and/or political parties can influence appointments is lower than is formally the case. 
Sometimes this can be attributed to a lack of knowledge about specific organizations 
and their statutes, but more generally these respondents stated that the formal role of 
the minister is no more than a rubberstamp on the nomination or selection of the best 
candidate – prepared by the administration and/or professional headhunting agen-
cies. The minister’s signature on the appointment decision is only a formality accord-
ing to these respondents and can therefore not be interpreted as ‘influence’. 
 
In sum, while the formal influence of the minister is quite large (85% of executive 
bodies, 89% of non-departmental agencies, and all appointments in ministries), re-
spondents rate the political influence of ministers and political parties somewhat 
lower. In particular, all respondents agree that if political parties can exert influence at 
all, it is only through ministers who belong to their party. This raises the question how 
appointments are influenced in practice; do parties try to influence appointments 
through their ministers? Or, in other words, do ministers appoint candidates for party 
political reasons? 
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Figure 1. Can appointments be influenced formally by politicians and/or political par-
ties? (% of agreement) 
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Figure 2. In how many institutions do political actors/parties influence appointments? 
(% respondents agreement) 
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Partisan appointments do occur, according to the respondents (66%), but there are 
large differences between organizations and sectors. Political actors are interested in 
the appointment of some organizations but not all (see Figure 2). Some positions and 
organizations are rated as more politically salient for example because of the size of 
the organization (budget), their visibility (in the media and political debate), their acci-
dent prone nature, or because of their prestige. Important regulatory authorities like 
AFM (financial markets) and NZA (health authority) and longstanding institutionalized 
advisory bodies like SER are highest on the wish list of political actors/parties. 
Figure 3 and Table 5 offer more detail of the interest of political parties. Figure 
3 shows that political influence is exerted more frequently in appointments within min-
istries and non-departmental agencies (in about 70% of the organizations) than in 
executive agencies. In fact, there is no room for political influence in the majority of 
executive agencies (53%), according to the respondents. Therefore, it would seem 
that the closer a position is to the core of the government, the more interested politi-
cal actors are in trying to influence appointments. 
 
Do political parties/actors appoint?
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Figure 3. Do political parties/actors influence appointments in practice, per category of 
organizations? (% respondents agreement) 
 
The sector where respondents report the highest degrees of influence by political 
parties and actors concerns the media, in particular broadcasting (see Table 5). This 
is a relatively small sector compared to the other sectors in this study, but due to the 
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Dutch history of pillarization it is still a highly politicized one. Respondents report that 
political parties are very interested in vacancies and will actively seek opportunities to 
push candidates from their own network. The reader should note that the Dutch 
broadcasting sector is very complex; there are several broadcasting associations, 
most of which are based on ideological and religious convictions. These are private 
organizations, but funded by the government based on the number of members. In 
the boards of these private organizations one can find many (former) politicians, be-
cause their political networks offers access to the political arena and/or other re-
sources. This is known as patronage from the demand side.2
The Dutch broadcasting sector was recently reorganized, and one new public 
broadcasting company (NPO) was established. Appointments to the non-executive 
board of NPO are now the minister’s prerogative; before all broadcasting associa-
tions formed the board. The appointment of the CEO has become the prerogative of 
the non-executive board. All respondents agree that the appointment of the most re-
cent CEO of NPO is a typical (and the first) example of de-politicization; the selection 
of the appointed candidate was based solely on merit.  
In sum, the reduction of the influence of private broadcasting associations and 
political parties has been formalized with the implementation of the new system struc-
ture, but in practice political parties remain very interested in all vacancies. 
 
Table 5. Do political parties/actors influence appointments, per sector? (% yes) 
 Formal Expert 
opinion
Party in-
fluence
Large role 
of party
Most insti-
tutions 
Top level 
only
Economy 80% 100% 100% 40% 60% 100%
Finance 100% 67% 33% 33% 0% 67%
Judiciary 100% 60% 20% 0% 20% 60%
Media 100% 33% 100% 100% 67% 100%
Military Police 78% 63% 25% 22% 0% 33%
Health care 100% 83% 83% 0% 0% 50%
Culture Educ. 100% 100% 100% 25% 0% 25%
Foreign & dev. 100% 100% 80% 40% 20% 80%
Regional Local 100% 100% 50% 40% 20% 40%
 
Appointments in two other sectors are also considered politicized: economy and for-
eign affairs and development aid. In the case of economy, respondents often refer to 
the appointment of SER members and the appointment of a number of market regu-
lators like NMA as examples of appointments in which political parties/actors are 
most interested. In fact, the composition of the SER reflects the power distribution in 
                                                 
2 Piattoni, S. (ed.). (2001). Clientelism, interests and democratic representations: the Euro-
pean experience in historical and comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. 
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parliament as far as the Crown Members are concerned; each party has its share of 
Crown Members. In the case of foreign affairs the appointment of ambassadors or in-
ternational representatives (with UN or EU) is frequently mentioned as a reward for 
loyal party members. Although the diplomat service is a typical career service where 
officials have to rise through the ranks – moving from less interesting posts to more 
prestigious ones – on occasion outsiders will be appointed. Career diplomats will not 
openly express disconcert with such appointments (because of their loyalty to the 
minister) but they are frowned upon. 
Two other interesting conclusions can be made based on Table 5. First, ap-
pointments in the ministries of health care, and education and culture are considered 
much politicized but appointments in organizations at arms’ length in those sectors 
are not. This explains the somewhat contradictory findings for these sectors. And 
second, appointments in the military, judiciary and financial sector are the least politi-
cized. Positions in these sectors require a certain background (training, prior experi-
ence), which precludes appointments of outsiders and for non-merit reasons.  
 
If political influence is exerted on appointments it usually concerns only the top level 
appointments (directors, CEO, DG, SG, boards), and not lower level appointments. 
Respondents report the least influence on appointments, even in the top positions, in 
the sectors of culture and education, and the military and police. For example, in the 
military the minister is involved in appointments until the rank of colonel, but all other 
officers are appointed by the central commander CDS (who is himself appointed by 
the minister). 
 
Based on the respondents’ answers, we can now calculate the scope and reach of 
party patronage for the nine Dutch policy sectors (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Scope and reach of party patronage 
 Ministry NDA Executive Overall
Formal influence (0-1) 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.96
Expert opinion (0-1) 0.86 0.76 0.49 0.67
Party can influence (0-1) 0.74 0.69 0.47 0.60
Role of party (0-1) 0.18 0.40 0.37 0.34
How many institutions (0-2) 1.18 1.20 0.85 1.05
Level (0-3) 0.79 0.80 0.59 0.70
 
Conclusions 
Political parties can influence appointments in the nine Dutch policy sectors because 
ministers are in charge of these appointments in almost all the organizations in this 
study – although less in the executive organizations. Experts rate this influence lower 
because they make a distinction between the formal role of a minister in appoint-
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ments and potential partisan influences. Certain sectors are more prone to political 
influence (media, economy, foreign affairs) than others (military and policy, judiciary, 
finance). And certain organizations attract more interest from political parties (SER, 
broadcasting, and regulatory authorities) than others. However, political influence 
never reaches beyond the top level positions. 
 
 
Motives for party patronage 
 
Why would political parties/actors be interested in appointments, and try to influence 
them? What would they hope to gain from this influence? Figure 4 shows the motives 
that respondents have mentioned for political parties and actors to influence ap-
pointments. It is difficult to generalize the motives; most respondents state that in one 
organization one motive can be important, and in another organization another mo-
tive. Hence, the answer ‘mixed’ is the largest category. 
 
Why do political parties/actors appoint?
Reward
8%
Control
31%
Mixed
43%
Other
18%
 
Figure 4. Motives for political parties to influence appointments (% of respondents) 
 
Clientelism (rewarding loyal party activists) is more exception than rule. Although 
many respondents mention examples of appointments as rewards, these examples 
are said to be exceptions – most respondents also mention the same examples for 
example of former ministers or members of parliament (MPs) being appointed as the 
CEO of an important regulatory authority, or as the mayor of a municipality. More-
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over, even in such cases it is rare that an appointee is considered incompetent for 
the function, which makes it difficult to pinpoint whether these appointments are in-
deed the result of favouritism of politicians/ministers. 
 The motive that is mentioned most often by the respondents refers to the con-
trol that political parties or ministers hope to gain by appointing a trustee to a certain 
position. Because of the inherent trust in an appointee from the same party, parties 
and ministers hope to have easy access to information - through the mutual network 
lines. Also, it is assumed that the appointee will carry out his task in a way that fits 
with the beliefs or plans of the appointer and/or the political party. However, many re-
spondents also state that it is not uncommon for an appointee to do just the opposite, 
to demonstrate their independence and disprove that they are appointed because of 
their political affiliations – because appointees fear that they would not be considered 
competent. Members of non-executive boards and CEOs will act in the best interest 
of the organization they serve, rather than in line with the party programme.  
Other motives that are mentioned (18%) refer to for example the appointment 
of personal friends or former colleagues/associates. Again, the implicit trust and fa-
miliarity between appointer and appointee is decisive to such decisions. On occasion, 
respondents have mentioned examples of an appointment as ‘getting rid’ of some-
one; for example, a minister who cannot get along with a top civil servant may ap-
point him/her to another position, outside the ministry.  
 
Despite the existence of these motives for party patronage, almost all respondents 
(96%, see Figure 5) agree that the most important criterion for an appointment is 
merit; professional competencies, skills, and experience determine whether a certain 
candidate is selected and appointed. This fits with the growing trend of professionali-
zation of selection procedures, by using head hunting agencies and assessments 
(tests) which will be discussed later on. 
The dominance of merit as criterion for appointments is however interpreted in 
different ways. Most respondents have noted a change in the appreciation of certain 
skills and competencies in the public domain; rather than substantive knowledge of a 
certain sector, top level officials nowadays have to have managerial skills. About half 
of the respondents appreciate this change, but the other half considers it to be a 
change for the worse. The rise of managerialism in the public sector places more em-
phasis on knowledge of managerial and political processes rather than knowledge 
about the policy history of a sector, a network of contacts and the ability to determine 
the fit of a new policy in a specific sector/tradition. Respondents who consider the in-
creased mobility of civil servants – partly due to the ABD – a good development, 
point to the benefits of the influx of new ideas (fresh eyes, innovations) and the im-
provement of the management of public organizations (application of new techniques 
like performance indicators). Respondents who consider the increased mobility a bad 
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development point to the memory loss of the government, the constant need for 
(structural) change and a short term focus, which leads to the destruction of know-
ledge, organizations, networks and traditions, inefficiency and poor policy. 
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38
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
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Figure 5. Criteria for appointment (% of respondents) 
 
Respondents also have different opinions about the role of political affiliations in the 
selection and appointment procedures. Political affiliations can refer both to some-
one’s viewpoints and to his/her membership of a political party. While 64% of the re-
spondents mention political affiliations as important to appointments, this can take on 
different forms. First, most top level officials in public and semi-public organizations 
have to have a degree of sensitivity for political matters as that is required for their 
function. Therefore, they usually have a certain degree of political awareness, re-
gardless of being a member of a political party. Second, public officials are more ori-
ented and interested in the public ‘cause or interest’; that is often why they want to 
work in the public sector. This awareness can be translated into a party membership. 
But even without a party membership, it is often not difficult to find out what view-
points a certain top level official holds from his/her past performance. Respondents 
therefore state that even if it is not public knowledge to which party a certain candi-
date belongs, ‘one usually has a pretty good idea where (s)he stands’. Therefore it is 
not a question that is asked of candidates, according to all (!) respondents. Third, 
outright partisan appointments – where the appointer appointees a fellow party 
member – are rare. In fact, many respondents state that ‘a strong minister will ap-
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point candidates from other parties to create a system of checks and balances’.  Or 
an appointer will appoint a candidate because his/her viewpoints fit with the require-
ments of a specific function or task. Particularly when changes have to be imple-
mented, either in policy or in the organization, an appointer will select a candidate 
who has similar viewpoints about those changes and/or has prior experience with 
similar changes. 
In sum, the political element does play an important role in appointments in 
the Dutch public domain, but seldom in a partisan way. In fact, when asked 91% of 
the respondents state that Dutch political parties have a strong tradition of distributing 
and sharing appointments. This fits with the Dutch tradition of consocialism, in which 
coalition cabinets are seeking consensus and societal support. This distribution of 
appointments is most visible in the (representative) composition of advisory bodies 
and non-executive boards. To outsiders, the distribution of appointments may seem a 
very political process, but it is actually an attempt to depoliticize decision and policy 
making. 
 The third and final criterion for appointments (personal, see Figure 5) refers to 
two processes: (1) appointments of former associates/colleagues and (2) the ap-
pointment of a candidate who is ‘known’ for his/her performance and viewpoints. The 
personality and reputation of a candidate can contribute to his/her appointment. 
 
Conclusion 
Political affiliations of candidates do play a role in their appointment, but in different 
and rather opaque ways. Respondents conclude that it is the ‘mix’ of professional 
competencies, political sensitivity and personal reputation that determine whether a 
candidate is appointed. Political elements are thus the X-factor in appointment pro-
cedures; you have to have it, but nobody knows exactly what it is. 
 
 
Appointment practices 
 
One of the reasons why respondents conclude that political parties cannot exert di-
rect influence on appointments is the increased professionalization of selection and 
appointment procedures. The use of head hunting agencies and assessments in the 
selection of candidates reduces the chances of candidates to be appointed because 
of their political affiliations. Political parties who push candidates for certain positions 
will have to make sure that their candidate is qualified and competent, and even then 
they cannot be certain that (s)he is the best candidate who will ‘win’ the selection. 
The professionalization of the appointment procedures fits with the aforemen-
tioned rise of managerialism. Moreover, because of managerialism the managerial 
competencies of candidates are becoming more and more important. In the Dutch 
system, political functions are not always seen as executive or managerial, which 
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probably explains why a number of respondents have said that managerialism has 
reduced the appointment opportunities for former politicians. All in all, managerialism 
is one of the most important changes in appointment practices over the last decades 
(see Table 7), also because it is linked to a number of other changes: professionali-
zation of procedures, more mobility, and shorter terms of appointment. 
 De-politicization is mentioned most often. This refers to two interrelated 
changes: (1) the decrease of the influence of national political parties and (2) the de-
centralization of appointment decisions. In many cases, the national government has 
hived off the responsibility to make appointments to for example the non-executive 
boards of semi-public organizations (like the board of commissioners of state owned 
companies). In the case of the appointment of mayors municipal councils have been 
granted more influence; they nominate a candidate and this nomination is usually ac-
cepted by the minister of the Home Office and affirmed by Royal Decision. The tradi-
tional influence of national political parties has consequently been reduced, in favour 
of local political parties (in the council). More information on mayoral appointments 
will be given below. 
 
Table 7. Changes in appointment practices 
 Mentioned by # respondents
De-politicization of sector 16
Managerialism 14
Gender debate 9
Professionalization of procedures 8
Parties have become more active 4
More mobility within the sector 4
Shorter terms of appointment 2
No changes 2
Other 1
 
A very recent change in appointment practices is the gender debate. The number of 
women in top positions in the Dutch public sector is very low. (See for example the 
number of female respondents in this study.) The current cabinet has therefore is-
sued policies to appoint more women. One example is the announcement of the min-
ister of the Home Office that the next police head commissioner has to be a woman, 
or else the minister will not appoint the nominated candidate. Respondents are gen-
erally sympathetic to the debate, although some question the effectiveness of such 
measures. 
Finally, a number of respondents has mentioned that some political parties 
have become more active in their attempts to influence appointments in the public 
sector. Table 7 lists only four respondents who have mentioned this as a change, but 
during the interviews the increased interest of parties in appointments was mentioned 
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quite often. Parties do differ however strongly in how active they are in this respect, 
and also how organized they go about it. CDA was mentioned by about one third of 
the respondents as the most successful party when it comes to obtaining a share of 
appointments. There are different explanations for this success. The size and gov-
erning tradition of the party were mentioned most often; CDA has the highest number 
of seats in parliament, and has been in office for over 80 years – except in the 1990s 
when two consecutive cabinets were formed without CDA. According to the respon-
dents, this absence of power has traumatized the party and has led to a severe loss 
of appointment opportunities. As a result, CDA members have been very active in 
pushing and appointing candidates from their party since their return to power after 
2000, according to these respondents. But CDA is also applauded by respondents 
for being a ‘governors’ party which has a strong tradition of supplying good candi-
dates for board and CEO positions. Moreover, CDA is well reputed for having a sys-
tem to keep track of upcoming vacancies and potential candidates (see Table 8 and 
more below). Other political parties are reported to be less interested and less active, 
either because party patronage does not fit with their (liberal) viewpoints, because 
the party network is less coherent, or because they are small parties without the re-
sources to supply candidates and/or keep track of interesting positions. Almost all re-
spondents agree however that in the Dutch system no party is excluded from the op-
portunity to obtain a share of appointments; candidates of opposition parties are not 
excluded because of their affiliations. However, parties do have to be acknowledged 
by other parties as being a trustworthy party i.e. by being stable or durable and well-
organized. New parties will therefore have to wait a while before they can enter into 
the distributive system of appointments. 
 
As mentioned, some parties have a well-organized system to keep track of vacancies 
and select potential candidates from the party network. This system is known to al-
most half (43%) of the respondents as the ‘party lobbyist’, a member of parliament 
who is charge of this task (see Table 8).3 Originally, the party lobbyist was in charge 
of selecting and pushing candidates for mayoral appointments. During the times of 
pillarization, political parties had a strict distribution formula for mayoral positions, es-
pecially in the four largest cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, 
The Hague). However, because of depillarization this formula is no longer upheld – 
as the appointment of the mayor of Rotterdam during this study showed. Respon-
dents expected Rotterdam to get a CDA mayor, but instead the municipal council se-
lected a PVDA politician who was consequently appointed by Royal Decision. 
 
                                                 
3 The party lobbyist was mentioned by respondents from all sectors, except from the sector 
of foreign affairs and development aid. 
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Table 8. Within political parties, who is in charge of appointments? 
 Mentioned by # respondents
‘Party lobbyist’ 21
Party network 7
Spokesmen in parliament 6
Minister 5
Party leader 3
Members of parliament 2
Do not know 5
 
The loss of influence of national parties on mayoral appointments has not meant a 
reduction of their interest in appointments. On the contrary, respondents mentioned 
several examples of activities by the party lobbyist and other party members, or even 
an expansion of lobbying to functions within the administration and in semi-public or-
ganizations. Also, respondents referred to party initiatives to make inventories of po-
tential candidates for all kinds of functions, within the party and for certain public 
functions, and the existence of talent scouting committees that assess the capabili-
ties of proposed candidates and interested party members. These examples were 
not limited to CDA, but also included parties like VVD and PVDA. 
It is not always clear – including for respondents – who is involved in selecting, 
nominating and pushing candidates from the party network. The information about 
vacancies is spread throughout the network, at different occasions (meetings). In 
some cases candidates take the initiative themselves and approach the party to en-
sure that they will be supported when applying for a position. In that respect, it is im-
portant to note that party members, in particular the party lobbyist, do not only play a 
role in supporting nominations but also in discouraging candidates who are believed 
to be not competent enough for the position or when the distribution mechanism will 
favour candidates from other parties. In both cases the party will try to discourage 
candidates to avoid loss of face/reputation, either for the party or for the candidates.  
 
Conclusion 
(All) Dutch political parties are certainly interested in appointments to positions in the 
public sector – although in different degrees in different sectors and for different posi-
tions. Most parties have organized a system or appointed someone to carry out this 
task (keeping track of vacancies and contacting or pushing potential candidates). A 
number of recent developments has however made this task more difficult, in particu-
lar the increased professionalization of selection and appointment procedures. 
 Parties in office can exert more influence than opposition parties because 
‘their minister is in charge of appointments, but respondents all agree that it is a 
Dutch tradition to share appointments between all parties. This fits with the need of 
parties to co-operate and form coalitions, but also with the consensual tradition of 
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Dutch politics.4
 
 
Sector differences 
 
There are many differences between the nine sectors under investigation in this 
study, some of which have already been discussed (cf. Table 5). Here we will take a 
brief look at the different sectors. Table 9 shows the scope and reach of party pa-
tronage per sector (based on the same calculations as in Table 6). 
 
Table 9. Scope and reach of party patronage, per sector (N=49) 
 Formal 
(0-1) 
Expert 
opinion 
(0-1)
Party can 
influence
 (0-1)
Role of 
parties
 (0-1)
How many 
institu-
tions (0-2) 
Which 
level (0-3)
Economy 0.93 0.93 1.0 0.4 2.0 1.0
Finance 1.0 0.67 0.33 0.22 0.78 0.56
Judiciary 1.0 0.67 0.33 0 0.87 0.53
Media 1.0 0.33 1.0 1.0 1.67 1.0
Military/Police 1.0 0.54 0.25 0.33 1.11 0.72
Health care 1.0 0.72 0.72 0 0.72 0.72
Culture/Educ. 0.67 0.75 0.75 0.17 0.92 0.75
Foreign/Devel. 1.0 1.0 0.80 0.53 1.07 0.80
Regional Loc. 1.0 0.83 0.50 0.40 0.60 0.40
Overall 0.96 0.67 0.60 0.34 1.05 0.70
 
Economy 
The influence of political actors is considered relatively high in this sector. Parties are 
perceived to play an active role, pushing candidates for vacancies in most institutions 
that were selected for this sector – although not below the top level. This high degree 
of party patronage can in large part be explained by the fact that a number of very 
important organizations have been included in the sample, like the advisory body 
SER, the national bank DNB, and some important regulators like AFM (financial mar-
kets) and NMA (competition).  
 As discussed before, political affiliations are very important in appointments to 
SER because of the representation of different ideological viewpoints, indicated by 
the membership of a political party in particular of the Crown Members of SER. Inter-
estingly, it is not the minister of Economics who appoints these members, but the 
minister of Social Affairs (SZW). In fact, respondents also indicated that the minister 
of Finance plays an important role in this sector – perhaps more important than the 
                                                 
4 Baakman, N. (2004). De nomenklatoera in Nederland. Over het verschijnsel van partijpoli-
tieke benoemingen. In: G. Voerman (ed.). Jaarboek DNPP 2003. Groningen. [pp. 173-197] 
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minister of Economics – for example because of his formal role of shareholder in the 
state-owned companies that were also included in the sample. The role of the minis-
ter is more important anyway than the role of political parties; they can only exert in-
fluence through their minister. 
 
Finance 
Although there is a strong formal influence of the minister when it comes to appoint-
ments in this sector, all respondents agree that there is little room for political influ-
ence, either by the minister or political parties. Appointments are based on merit i.e. 
the knowledge and prior experience of a candidate in the financial or economic sec-
tor. Outsiders are seldom appointed because they lack the necessary training back-
ground – which also explains why respondents state that the ABD plays only a minor 
role in this sector. 
Three organizations would be considered more of interest to political parties 
and actors: AFM and DNB (see above) and the national court of audit. As explained 
before, appointments to the court of audit are done by parliament. This is one of the 
few instances where political parties can exercise direct influence on appointments. 
Fitting with the Dutch tradition it is however customary to distribute the top level func-
tions between candidates from different parties; there has to be a balance between 
merit and different political affiliations (the ‘mix’). In the cases of AFM and DNB it has 
been emphasized that appointees have to have relevant experience and capacities, 
but because these organizations are considered very important and prestigious po-
litical parties/actors will be (actively) interested. 
 
Judiciary 
Most respondents – even from other sectors – agree that the judiciary is an example 
par excellence of impartiality and neutrality. The separation of powers (executive, 
legislative, and judiciary) implies that people in this sector refrain from overt political 
activities. The number of members of parliament and/or the cabinet originating from 
this sector is indeed low. Party membership is considered a private matter. 
Consequently, according to the respondents all appointments are based on 
merit. While the minister formally appoints CEOs and members of non-executive 
boards in a majority of the organizations selected for this sector, there is always the 
requirement of a legal degree for appointees (in Dutch: rechterlijk ambtenaar). The 
judiciary is a career based sector; people rise through the ranks. Many appointees – 
judges, prosecutors – will not openly express their political affiliations or belong to a 
certain political party. Ministerial influence is also limited to the top level functions; all 
other appointments are carried out by CEOs, executive and non-executive boards 
(cf. de-politicization in Table 7). Party patronage is thus very low or perhaps even ab-
sent in this sector, with one exception: the appointment of members of the High 
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Council by parliament. 
 
Media 
The media, in particular the broadcasting companies and associations, can perhaps 
be considered as the sector with the highest degree of party patronage (see Table 5). 
Although the minister has delegated the authority to appoint the CEO of the public 
broadcasting company NPO to the board, political parties remain actively interested 
in vacancies and will push their own candidates. In the private broadcasting associa-
tions many former politicians are appointed, as a type of ‘patronage from the demand 
side’. 
 As far as the other selected organizations in this sector are concerned, there 
is limited interest in them from political parties. As with NPO, recent system changes 
have delegated appointments to non-executive boards making appointments less 
open to political influences (cf. de-politicization in Table 7). 
 
Military and Police 
The respondents disagreed strongly about the existence and degree of political influ-
ence on appointments in this ‘sector’. Therefore, additional interviews were held to 
obtain more clarity, but without much success as the differences of opinion contin-
ued. Perhaps the level of patronage in the military can better be described in the 
words of respondents themselves: ‘it is not your political colour that determine to 
what position you are appointed, but the colour of your uniform does’. This conclu-
sion refers to the fact that top positions in the military rotate between officers from the 
navy, the air force, the ground forces and recently also the military police (in Dutch: 
marechaussee). The military is led by the Commander of Armed Forces (CDS), who 
is appointed by the minister. CDS is a military officer, coming from one of the four di-
visions within the military. While he has to have a certain degree of political sensitivity 
– as he is the link between the military and the minister/politicians – he is not se-
lected for his political affiliation, even if that was known. 
Within each division, military officers have a strong group spirit; they form year 
groups that ‘adopt’ officers from the next year group to further each others’ career. 
These relations are expressed in familial terms, like father and son. Promotion oppor-
tunities are based on your performance in the past, but your ‘father’ can help you by 
recommending you to the senior officers who are in charge of appointments. This is a 
non-political system, although respondents do indicate that there are dominant ideo-
logical viewpoints within certain divisions of the military, for example many navy offi-
cers will vote for the liberal party VVD. An officer with different viewpoints will have a 
hard time to be accepted and promoted, but it is not impossible. It is however un-
common for military officers to have very divergent views due to the strong socializa-
tion processes in military training. 
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Respondents agree about the lack of political influence and interest in posi-
tions in both the civilian and military functions in the Ministry of Defence. In other or-
ganizations that were selected for this sector, like the intelligence agencies, merit and 
sometimes a military background are decisive to being appointed. 
One of the biggest problems that both the military and the police are faced 
with at the moment is the lack of women, particularly in top positions. Gender has 
therefore become an important requirement in the selection and appointment proce-
dures. 
 
Appointments within the police force are quite complex. The police force is divided 
into 24 regional bodies (ZBOs) and one national contract agency (KLPD). Each po-
lice region is governed by a ‘regional college’ consisting of the mayors and district at-
torneys of that region; police head commissioners take part in the meetings of the re-
gional college.5 Per region one mayor is selected as ‘manager’ (in Dutch: korpsbe-
heerder) of the police force in that region; this mayor is thus appointed by Royal De-
cision, based on a nomination by the minister of BZK and after consultation of vari-
ous actors (commissioner of the Queen, minister of justice, college of PG that gov-
erns the DA and the regional college). This mayor appoints all employees of the po-
lice force, after advice from the police head commissioner (in Dutch: hoofdcommis-
saris). The police head commissioner is appointed by Royal Decision, based on a 
nomination by the mayor/manager to the minister of BZK. Again various actors are 
consulted: commissioner of the Queen, minister of justice, the college of PG and the 
regional college. 
Respondents agree that political viewpoints and/or party membership of police 
head commissioners used to be common knowledge, but that has changed under the 
influence of the rise of managerialism. A management development programme has 
been initiated and appointment procedures have been professionalized. Also, the 
complicated appointment process makes it difficult for (national) political parties to 
exert influence. In fact, one could say that the regionalization and autonomization of 
the police force has led to de-politicization of the police force as a whole. (On the 
other hand police head commissioners have become important actors at the local 
and regional level; their visibility in the media and the political arena has increased.) 
 
Health Care 
The respondents from the health care sector were unanimous in their answers about 
appointments in this sector; there are one or two examples of ‘political’ appointments 
(like in the case of NZA where a former minister was appointed) but generally ap-
                                                 
5 Because of the regional scale of the police force, information on appointments was obtai-
ned through the interviews with respondents from the sector ‘local and regional government’ 
rather than ‘military and police’. See also Appendix 1. 
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pointments are based on merit and prior experience within this sector. Outsiders are 
seldom appointed; positions in this sector require too specialist knowledge. For ex-
ample, the non-executive board of an (academic) hospital will not appoint a non-
medical candidate as CEO – although lower ranking management functions will be 
carried out by professional managers. This lack of political interest and influence is 
an interesting finding because the minister is in charge of almost all appointments in 
this sector,6 due to a recent change in the management structure of a number of 
non-departmental agencies (ZBOs). By removing the non-executive board, the minis-
ter has obtained the right to appoint all CEOs of this organization (in line with the 
charter law on ZBOs). However, in practice this has seldom led to partisan appoint-
ments. 
 Rather than political affiliation, another type of patronage seems to be at play 
in this sector; the representation of different sub-sectors. Several respondents re-
ferred to recent appointments of candidates who were selected because of their af-
filiation with for example patient federations, groups of medical professions, welfare 
or homecare organizations, and so on. The distribution of positions between such 
sub-sectors is an important instrument in this sector to obtain support for new policies 
and political decisions like the marketization of the health care sector. 
 A similar type of distribution is also found in the composition of the council for 
national health care (RVZ), the main advisory body in this sector. However, this is not 
unique to this sector, but part of the general pattern for appointments to advisory 
bodies in this study (see e.g. below on culture and education). Finally, as with other 
sectors, the respondents have all mentioned the importance of the gender debate 
and the need to appoint more women to top positions.  
 
Culture and Education 
From all respondenst, the respondents from this sector complained the most about 
the rise of managerialism; they claim that decentralization of legal competencies and 
finances, large scale mergers of educational institutions leading to bureaucratization, 
the high mobility among civil servants and constant re-organizations and budget cuts 
have undermined the quality and effectiveness of educational policies. There are but 
few people left who understand the legal and financial peculiarities of this sector. Ap-
pointments are more based on managerial competencies than substantive knowl-
edge which will only reinforce the memory loss and inefficient policy making. 
The Dutch system of education has a complex background due to pillarization 
and the pacification in the early 1900s when political parties reached a compromise 
on the financing of ‘special’ schools (in Dutch: bijzonder onderwijs). All schools in the 
                                                 
6 One of the selected organizations, the food regulation authority VWA is subordinated to the 
ministry of Agriculture. Respondents were therefore not familiar with this agency and could 
not provide information about appointments to this agency. 
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Netherlands, whether they are public or based on private initiative (religious or oth-
erwise) are funded by the state if they meet certain legal criteria. Parents have a 
Constitutional right to send their children to a school of their ideological or religious 
beliefs. If there is no such school, they can establish one themselves – paid for by 
the state. (The budget for education is the largest budget in the State Budget.) At 
first, this led to a highly centralized system in which the national government would 
prescribe detailed regulations. Over time, the national government has delegated a 
lot of competencies to municipalities and school boards. Municipalities in turn have 
‘autonomized’ the public schools, to avoid a conflict of interest with their responsibili-
ties for the implementation of educational policies.  
Consequently, the Dutch education system is nowadays characterized by a 
high degree of autonomy for all educational institutions. The influence of the minister 
and the ministry has diminished over time, including on appointments (in public insti-
tutions as there never was influence in non-public ones). A second characteristic re-
sulting from this history is that there are still many remnants of pillarization. For ex-
ample, several political parties still have strong linkages to schools and school 
boards. Earlier on (see above on broadcasting associations) this was referred to as 
patronage from the demand side. 
The cultural sector has a very different background. Contrary to other coun-
tries, culture has always been a non-political matter. As a result, there has never 
been much interest in policies on art and/or cultural institutions, except for financial 
aspects. Appointments to important positions do not attract much attention for politi-
cal parties/actors. As in the educational sector, the rise of managerialism has had a 
strong impact, both in terms of policy-making (emphasizing the business side of art 
and culture) and in terms of the management of cultural institutions. For example, 
museum directors are nowadays expected to be managers first and caretaker of the 
art that is on display second. Similar changes can be observed in the appointment of 
non-executive board members; boards are looking for candidates with managerial 
and financial knowledge. Appointment procedures will become more professional-
ized, as part of the professionalization of the sector as a whole – although not all re-
spondents consider this a positive trend. 
In sum, in this sector the minister has a high degree of influence on appoint-
ments within the ministry, but a low degree of influence on appointments outside the 
ministry. This explains the somewhat contradictory findings in Table 9. The rise of 
managerialism has been very strong and, according to the respondents, not for the 
better. 
 
Foreign Affairs and Development Aid 
This sector is a career service in all respects. For example, the ABD does not play a 
role of any significance, outsiders are seldom appointed, candidates have to rise 
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through the ranks going from less appealing to more prestigious posts, and candi-
dates come from a homogeneous, closed network. Nevertheless, the respondents 
mention a high degree of political influence (or interest) on appointments. They point 
mostly to the role of the minister who has to decide about the nominations to high 
ranking and prestigious positions. Respondents also point to the large differences in 
the interest and involvement of individual ministers in the past cabinets. The degree 
of party patronage in this sector would therefore appear to be highly contingent upon 
who and which party are in charge. In the interviews respondents were asked to an-
swer the questions focussing on the current and last two or three cabinets only. Ap-
parently, the interest of the current minister in appointments is high. It is however not 
possible to conclude that this is typical for this sector. In fact, some respondents have 
mentioned a number of developments that would suggest that political influences are 
decreasing, such as the professionalization of appointment procedures, and the ex-
pansion of the training programmes allowing for more diversity in gender, family 
background and academic degrees. The diplomat service remains however a closed 
network, where outsiders are not heartily welcomed. The diplomat service is also a 
very traditional and conservative network where the gender debate has only just be-
gun. Political affiliations are not considered decisive to appointments, but there is lit-
tle variation in ideological viewpoints among the diplomat corps. 
Another reason for the high score on party patronage for this sector can be 
found in the fact that appointments to international posts have the reputation for be-
ing a ‘reward’ position for former politicians. Respondents were able to mention sev-
eral examples of such appointments – and newspapers reported on a couple of such 
appointments during this study. 
A third and final reason for the high scores on party patronage relates to de-
velopment aid rather than the diplomat service. According to the respondents, politi-
cal parties are very interested in development aid because it is a ‘spending’ depart-
ment and it spends money on a good cause. There are few political risks and much 
political gains in this field. Moreover, the position of the minister of development aid is 
a prestigious one because of its international character (the same applies to minister 
of foreign affairs who can even substitute for the prime minister in international nego-
tiations). 
All in all, the sector of foreign affairs and developmental aid attract a lot of at-
tention from political parties and actors. Whether this is a systematic or temporary 
feature – dependent upon which party and minister are in charge – cannot be con-
cluded on the basis of the five interviews alone. That would require more research. 
 
Regional and Local Government 
Regional and local government are not a sector in the same way as the other sec-
tors. It includes all 12 provinces, almost 400 municipalities, and over 60 water boards 
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and PBOs (based on article 134 of the Constitution). Furthermore, municipalities 
have their own types of NDA and executive organizations, which we have included 
here as one category. However, the number of interviewees with knowledge about 
this category of organizations is too limited to be able to draw conclusions. As men-
tioned before, the police regions were included in the interviews of this sector as well, 
leading to a total of nine interviews (six on local and regional government and three 
on police regions). The findings on the police were already dealt with before. The 
complexities and size of this ‘sector’ require a lot more research to be able to draw 
solid conclusions. The findings in this study will therefore remain somewhat superfi-
cial and generalist. 
 In general we can conclude that the influence of national political parties - ei-
ther direct or through their minister – has diminished in this sector. First of all, this in-
fluence never reached deeper than the top level anyway; the minister of BZK nomi-
nates for example the Commissioner of the Queen (province) and the mayor (munici-
pality), but not the executives and top civil servants. CQs and mayors are appointed 
by Royal Decision. Second, the right to appoint in this ‘sector’ has been delegated to 
the authorities at the local level and/or the non-executive boards of organizations. For 
example, the local municipal council will nominate a candidate for a mayoral position 
(although in concurrence with the CQ of the province). There is no more distributive 
formula for mayoral appointments anymore. In the case of PBOs, the board will ap-
point candidates nominated by the industry that is represented by the PBO.7 Third, 
although the introduction of general elections of the Water Boards in 2004 has in-
creased the influence of political parties because they can partake in the elections, it 
has proven difficult to find interested and capable candidates. Empirically, the influ-
ence of national political parties has not been very strong. And fourth, the rise of 
managerialism has reduced political influences on the appointment of police head 
commissioners (see above). Therefore, formally the minister of BZK has a large role 
in appointments in this ‘sector’ but in practice he has little influence, let alone partisan 
influence. Furthermore, the number of appointment opportunities is limited to the top 
level, and always the topic of (extensive) negotiations between a large number of ac-
tors, interests and organizations. 
 
 
                                                 
7 PBOs represent different branches of industry, for example bakers or painters, or industries 
that produce certain products like eggs or fish. All PBOs are supervised by SER, on behalf of 
the minster of Social Affairs. Appointments to SER were discussed in the sections on the see 
economic sector. 
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Conclusions 
 
The findings from this (qualitative) study show that Dutch political parties are actively 
interested in appointments to organizations in the public and semi-public sector. 
Their main motive is to gain control over a certain sector or organization; by appoint-
ing a trustworthy appointee, parties hope to have easy access to information and to 
ensure that policies are implemented in line with party programmes.  
Parties can however seldom exert direct influence on appointments because 
almost all appointments are the prerogative of the minister in charge of a specific pol-
icy sector. Therefore parties use indirect ways to exert influence, for example by 
nominating and pushing their own candidates, or influencing the appointing minister 
(from the same party). Information about vacancies is spread throughout the party 
network by different party members. Most parties have a system or a person who is 
in charge of this task; keeping track of vacancies and potential candidates (the ‘party 
lobbyist’). Furthermore, political parties have a tradition of sharing appointments; 
each party feels ‘entitled’ to a certain number of appointments. This fits with the 
Dutch tradition of consensualism. The party lobbyists make sure that parties can get 
their share.  
 There are big differences in the interest of parties for vacancies between sec-
tors and (type of) organizations. The strongest interest is found in the media, foreign 
affairs and development aid, and the economic sector. Parties are much less inter-
ested in appointments in the military, the judiciary and the financial sector. Organiza-
tions that attract a lot of attention are usually important regulatory and advisory bod-
ies. Reversely, non-executive boards and advisory bodies have a strong interest in 
obtaining members with access to political networks; this was labelled patronage 
from the demand side. In general one can conclude that political parties are more in-
terested in organizations that are closer to the government rather than executive or-
ganizations at (long) arms’ length. Furthermore, the interest never reaches deeper 
than appointments to the top level positions like CEO and board members. 
Over time the degree of influence of national political parties has diminished. This 
is due to a number of trends, most notably the rise of managerialism. This has led to 
a strong appreciation of managerial skills in candidates for appointment, and to a pro-
fessionalization of appointment procedures. Assessments and more transparency 
make it more difficult for parties to determine the outcome of a selection process. A 
second trend which has diminished the influence of national political parties refers to 
the delegation of the authority to appoint to for example local parties or non-executive 
boards. Some political parties have responded to this loss of influence by initiating 
new ways to increase the scope of appointments or the means to exert influence on 
appointers. 
Pure partisan appointments – to reward loyal party members – do still occur but 
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they are considered exceptions and generally frowned upon. Political affiliations are 
considered important assets of a candidate but in many different ways. For example, 
candidates for top level positions need to be politically sensitive and interested in the 
public cause. This can be translated into the membership of a political party, but not 
necessarily. Political aspects are part of a ‘mix’ of competencies, skills, knowledge 
(managerial and/or substantive), viewpoints and prior experience that will determine 
whether a certain candidate is appointed or not. This was labelled the X-factor; you 
have to have it, but nobody knows exactly what it is.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Sample of Dutch countries 
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CBS: central bureau for statistic
NMA: market competition authorit
OPTA: telecom competition authorit
TENNET: electricity infrastructure maintenanc
agency  
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AFM: financial markets competition authorit
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DNB: Dutch national bank 
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 CBP: privacy protection agency  
Cie. Gelijke Behandeling: tribunal for equal tre
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AIVD: intelligence agenc
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CVZ: advice on health insurance coverage, d
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CTZ: to determine tariffs for medical treatments 
and drugs  
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on market  
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RVGZ: Council for Health Care (advisory bod
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Culture 
Education
and 
 
e s  
s  
)  
 
 
 
 
Education Cultur
& Science  
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h  
(including Educa-
tion Inspectorate) 
N.W.O.: funds scientific researc
KNAW: royal academy for science
Div. fondsen voor kunst: funds to subsidize differ-
ent art forms  
Onderwijsraad: Education council (advisory body
y) Cultuurraad: Council for Culture (advisory bod
Public universities 
National museums 
Nationaal Archief: national archive 
  IB-Groep: student loan company
CFI: subsidies for primary and secondary schools
Foreign 
vices 
Ser- irs 
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 Foreign Affa NCDO: agency for developmental aid  
CBI: centre to promote import from developin
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Embassies and consulates
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-
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Province
Municipalities (G4; largest municipalities
Water Boards and other art. 134 Constitution 
ganizations 
Police authorities (regional) 
“Verbonden partijen” i.e. semi-independent organi
zations carrying out tasks for municipalities (G4 
only) 
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Appendix 2: Topic list for interviews 
 
Q1. Based on content analyses: is an institution formally reachable by political parties, i.e. do parties have legal power to appoint individuals to 
jobs in this institution?) 
Q2. In your opinion, are the institutions formally reachable by political parties, i.e. in general, do people linked to political parties have legal 
power to appoint individuals to jobs in these institutions? 
Q3. In your opinion, DO such individuals (ministers, PM, President, party chairman) actually appoint individuals to jobs in the institutions? 
Q4. If yes, what role do political parties play in these appointments? (large/small role) 
Q5a. If yes, would you say that political parties appoint (in a few/most/all institutions)? 
Q5b. If yes, would you say that political parties appoint at top/middle/bottom level? 
Q6: In your opinion, why do political parties actually appoint people to these jobs? Are they interested in rewarding their loyal party activists and 
members with state jobs or do they want to control these sectors and institutions by having personnel linked to the party appointed in them?  
Q7: Now, we want to ask you a question about the people appointed by political parties to these positions. Would you say that they have gotten 
their jobs because they are professionally qualified for them, or because of their political link, or because of their personal allegiance, or any 
other allegiance?  
Q8: Do you think that the current practices of appointments differ substantially from previous periods, say in the last 15-20 years? If so, how 
and why? 
Q9: In reality, who within the parties is responsible for making these appointments?  
Q10: In general, when political parties make appointments, are these appointments done only by parties currently in government, or do opposi-
tion parties also get a share of appointments in state institutions? 
Q11: Additional comments, questions and clarifications; e.g. potential explanations for the scope and extent of party patronage etc. 
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Appendix 3: Dutch respondents 
Name Experience (list is indicative, not comprehensive) 
Dr. N. Baakman Assistant professor Politics, University of Maastricht, investigator of patronage in the Netherlands 
Drs. D.J. van den Berg Former SG, former ambassador, currently board of TU Delft 
Prof.dr. P. van Bergeijk Former civil servant of ministry of Economics, currently professor at ISS 
Mr. P.J. Biesheuvel Former MP (CDA), several board positions in public sector including PBOs 
Dhr. J. Bik Retired reporter for NRC 
Drs. H. Bruins Slot Former top civil servant, CEO of a non-departmental agency, mayor and chair of NPO. Currently several board po-
sitions in public sector 
Drs. H. Brouwer Executive board member Dutch national bank, former civil servant 
Prof.dr. J. van Cuilenburg Member of Commissariaat voor de Media, parttime professor in communication studies 
Mr. A. van Delden Former president of Raad voor Rechtspraak, several positions in judiciary sector 
Prof.dr. H. Garretsen Former professor of Economics at UU and RU, currently professor of Economics at RUG and member of SER 
Mw. Drs. L. van Geest DG Ministry of Finance 
Mw. Prof.dr. L. Gunning-
Schepers 
Chair of executive board AMC academic hospital, chair of NFU (representing all academic hospitals) 
Drs. F.J. van der Heijden Former MP (CDA), former alderman and council member in Rotterdam, now retired 
Dr. D. Hermans Chair of executive board of CVZ, former board positions in social security sector 
Prof.dr. J. Hoffenaar NIMH, parttime professor Military History, military officer 
Mr. M. van den Honert Director of directorate in Ministry of Justice 
Dhr. C. Keller NPO (broadcasting) 
Prof.dr. C. Kolijn Parttime professor EUR, specialist in international security and defense 
Prof.dr. R. Koole Professor in politics, former chair of political party (PvdA) 
Prof.dr. P. van Koppen Professor at institute Study of Crime and Law Enforcement, University Leiden 
Dr. B. Kreemers Former spokesman ministry of Defense, now director RVZ (health care) and member of ABD 
Mw. Mr. M. van der Laan Former state secretary Media, former MP (D66), at the time of the interview director in private firm 
Mw. Ir. J. Leemhuis-Stout Several board positions in public sector, former CvdK 
Prof.dr. F. Leeuw Director WODC, part-time professor Law, Public Administration and Social Sciences at University Maastricht 
Prof.dr. F. Leijnse Former chair HBO council, former/current MP, part-time professor Open University 
Prof.dr. H. Leune Retired professor Sociology EUR, former chair of Onderwijsraad 
Mw. Dr. M. Lückerath-
Rovers 
Associate professor Fiscal Law, institute Regulation and Compliance EUR, investigates boards of commissioners 
in public and private sector 
Dhr. W. Meijer Former state secretary, currently several board positions in public sector including president of board of commis-
sioners NS 
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Name Experience (list is indicative, not comprehensive) 
Prof.dr. E. Müller COT, specialist in crisis management in public sector 
Drs. J.W. Oosterwijk Former SG, at the time of the interview member of executive board EUR 
Mr. W. Otto Several advisory positions in media sector, now independent consultant 
Dhr. J. Riezenkamp Former DG Ministry of Education, several board positions in cultural sector 
Dr. R. Roborgh DG Ministry of Education 
Prof.dr. P. Hoebink Professor in CIDIN at RU (specialist in development aid) 
Mr. U. Koesoemo Joedo Director/advisor at ABD 
Mw. Prof.dr. P. Meurs Professor IBMG at EUR, member of WRR, MP in Senate (PvdA), several board positions in public sector (health 
care) 
Prof.dr. K. Putters Professor IBMG at EUR, MP in Senate (PvdA), member of non-executive board OVV, former member RVZ 
Dr. A. Rinnooy Kan Chair of SER, former political positions (D66) 
Prof.dr. L. de la Rive Box Former director in ministry of Foreign Affairs, currently rector ISS 
Dhr. P. Tieleman Former chief of police, at the time of the interview advisor to School for Police Leadership 
Prof.dr. P. Tops Professor in public administration (local government), board member of Police Academy 
Mr. R. Vecht Official at NPO (broadcasting) 
Drs. C. Van ’t Veen Former DG, former director of museum, currently director RACM 
Prof.dr. R. In ’t Veld Retired professor of public administration, various (board) positions in the public sector, former dean of NSOB 
Dhr. K. Vijlbrief Director/advisor of ABD 
Prof.dr. J. Voorhoeve Former minister of Defense, part-time professor at Defense Academy NDA, member of Raad van State 
Mr. R. van Zutphen Chair of NVVR (representing legal sector), vice-president of court at Utrecht 
 
• Note that two respondents have asked to remain entirely anonymous. In both cases this concerned high ranking civil servants. 
• Two respondents were interviewed about more than one sector. 
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